We provide comparable algorithms for the Dekel-Fudenberg procedure, iterated admissibility and proper rationalizability by means of the concepts of preference restrictions and likelihood orderings. We apply the algorithms for comparing iterated admissibility and proper rationalizability, and provide a sufficient condition under which iterated admissibility does not rule out properly rationalizable strategies. Finally, we use the algorithms to examine an economically relevant strategic situation, namely a bilateral commitment bargaining game.
Introduction
In non-cooperative game theory, a player is cautious if he takes into account all opponents' strategies, also strategies that seem very unlikely to be chosen by the opponent. What outcomes of a strategic game are consistent with common belief of the event that all players are rational and cautious?
A number of contributions, starting with Brandenburger (1992) and Börgers (1994) , have shown that the Dekel-Fudenberg procedure (Dekel and Fudenberg, 1990) , where one round of elimination of weakly dominated strategies is followed by iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies, provides a robust answer to this question, in the sense that the eliminated strategies are definitely incompatible with common belief of the event that all players are rational and cautious. The procedure of iterated admissibility, which iteratively eliminates all weakly dominated strategies, rules out more strategies. So does the concept of proper rationalizability.
Both the Dekel-Fudenberg procedure and iterated admissibility are defined in terms of algorithms. While epistemic foundations for the former were provided relatively quickly (Brandenburger, 1992; Börgers, 1994) , half a century elapsed between the introduction of iterated admissibility in the 1950's and when Brandenburger et al. (2008) offered an epistemic foundation for this procedure.
The case of proper rationalizability is different. This concept was defined by Schuhmacher (1999) and Asheim (2001) by means of epistemic conditions. Schuhmacher defines, for every ε > 0, the ε-proper trembling condition, which states that if a player prefers one pure strategy over another, then the probability he assigns to the latter strategy should be at most ε times the probability he assigns to the former. Proper rationalizability is obtained by imposing common belief of the ε-proper trembling condition, and then letting ε tend to zero. Asheim's analysis of 2-player games builds on Blume et al. (1991a,b) in that it uses lexicographic probability systems to characterize proper rationalizability. More precisely, Asheim considers the event that players are cautious and respect the opponent's preferences, i.e., if the player believes that his opponent prefers one strategy over another, then the player should deem the former infinitely more likely. Any strategy that is a best response under common belief of this event is properly rationalizable. Schuhmacher (1999) provides an algorithm, iteratively proper trembling, which generates for a given ε > 0 the set of mixed strategy profiles that can be chosen under common belief of the ε-proper trembling condition. This procedure does not yield the set of properly rationalizable strategies directly, as we must still let ε go to zero, and see which strategies survive in the limit. Recently, Perea (2008) has provided an algorithm that directly computes the set of properly rationalizable strategies in 2-player games.
The purpose of the present paper is to present algorithms for the Dekel-Fudenberg procedure and iterated admissibility that build on the key concepts introduced by Perea (2008) , thereby making such established procedures comparable to the new algorithm for proper rationalizability. In Section 2, we introduce these key concepts: preference restrictions and likelihood orderings. In Section 3, we construct algorithms for the Dekel-Fudenberg procedure and iterated admissibility that are comparable with the one for proper rationalizability. In Section 4, we then put these algorithms to use. In particular, we offer examples illuminating the differences between iterated admissibility and proper rationalizability. Moreover, we provide a sufficient condition under which iterated admissibility does not rule out properly rationalizable strategies. Finally, we use the algorithms to examine an economically relevant strategic situation, namely a bilateral commitment bargaining game which has recently been analyzed by Ellingsen and Miettinen (2008) . In Section 5 we offer concluding remarks, while an appendix contains all proofs.
Preference Restrictions and Likelihood Orderings
Consider a finite strategic game G = (S 1 , S 2 , u 1 , u 2 ) with two players, where the finite set S i denotes the set of strategies for player i and u i : S 1 × S 2 → R denotes player i's utility function, for i ∈ {1, 2}. As usual, we extend u i to subjective probability distributions λ i ∈ ∆(A j ) over the opponent's strategies, writing u i (s i , λ i ) for the resulting subjective expected utility.
Each player i's preferences over his own strategies are determined by u i and a lexicographic probability system (LPS) (Blume et al., 1991a) with full support on S j . An LPS consists of a finite sequence of subjective probability distributions,
. . , k}. It follows that i is an asymmetric and transitive binary relation.
The following two definitions, which are taken from Perea (2008) , provide the key concepts for our algorithms.
Definition 1 (Preference restriction) A preference restriction on S i is a pair (s i , A i ), where s i ∈ S i and A i is a nonempty subset of S i .
The interpretation of a preference restriction (s i , A i ) is that player i prefers some strategy in A i to s i . Let R * i denote the collection of all sets of preference restrictions. For any set R i of preference restrictions, define the choice set C i (R i ) as follows:
i denote the set of all likelihood orderings on S i . For any subset L j of likelihood orderings on S j , let R i (L j ) denote the set of preference restrictions derived from L j in the following manner:
Here, we say that s i is weakly dominated by µ i on some subset A j ⊆ S j if u i (s i , s j ) ≤ u i (µ i , s j ) for every s j ∈ A j , with strict inequality for some s j ∈ A j . It follows that
Likelihood-orderings can be related to the ordinary belief operator as well as the assumption operator, as proposed by Brandenburger et al. (2008) (and discussed by Asheim and Søvik, 2005, Section 6 ).
Definition 3 (Believing an event) For a given non-empty subset A i ⊆ S i , we say that the likelihood ordering L i believes A i if, for every s i ∈ S i \A i , a i j s i for some a i ∈ S i . Definition 4 (Assuming an event) For a given subset A i ⊆ S i , we say that the likelihood ordering L i assumes A i if, for every s i ∈ S i \A i , a i j s i for every a i ∈ A i . So, if L i assumes a non-empty event A i it also believes the event A i , but not vice versa. Likelihood-orderings can also be related to respect of preferences as introduced by Blume et al. (1991b) .
Definition 5 (Respecting preferences) For a given subset R i ⊆ R * i of preference restrictions, we say that the likelihood ordering L i respects R i if, for every
Hence, if L i respects the set R i of preference restrictions, it also believes the
Let L b i (R i ) denote the set of likelihood orderings that believe player i's rationality when i's preferences satisfy the set R i of preference restrictions:
Let L a i (R i ) denote the set of likelihood orderings that assume player i's rationality when i's preferences satisfy the set R i of preference restrictions:
Finally, let L r i (R i ) denote the set of likelihood orderings that respect player i's preferences when i's preferences satisfy the set R i of preference restrictions:
It follows from the observations that assumption implies belief, but not vice versa, and respect of preferences implies belief of rationality, but not versa, that
Since the belief operator satisfies conjunction and monotonicity, the properties of the choice correspondence C i (·) imply that
for every R i , R i ∈ R * i . However, since the assumption operator satisfies conjunction but not monotonicity, it holds for every
while the inverse inclusion need not hold. Finally, Definition 5 implies that
Algorithms
In this section we provide comparable algorithms for the Dekel-Fudenberg procedure, iterated admissibility and proper rationalizability.
An algorithm for the Dekel-Fudenberg procedure
We first consider the Dekel-Fudenberg procedure (Dekel and Fudenberg, 1990) , which is the procedure where one round of maximal elimination of weakly dominated strategies is followed by iterated maximal elimination of strictly dominated strategies. Following Brandenburger (1992) , strategies surviving the Dekel-Fudenberg procedure are referred to as permissible.
Consider the following algorithm, which iteratedly increases the set of preference restrictions for both players:
Ini For both players i, let R 0 i = ∅.
DF For every n ≥ 1, and both players i, let
From the properties of L b i (·) and R i (·), it follows that Ini and DF determines, for each player, a non-decreasing sequence of sets of preference restrictions and a non-increasing sequence of sets of likelihood orderings (where non-decreasing and non-increasing are defined w.r.t. set inclusion). As a consequence, the sequence C i (R n i ) of choice sets is non-increasing. Since the set of preference restrictions is finite, the algorithm converges after a finite number of rounds.
For both players i, let R ∞ i := ∞ n=1 R n i be the limiting set of preference restrictions produced by the algorithm defined by Ini and DF.
Proposition 1 Let G be a finite 2-player strategic game. Then, for both players i, a strategy s i is permissible if and only if s i ∈ C i (R ∞ i ).
Proof. See the appendix.
An algorithm for iterated admissibility
Iterated admissibility is the procedure of iterated maximal elimination of weakly dominated strategies.
Consider the following algorithm:
IA For every n ≥ 1, and both players i, let
From the properties of R i (·), it follows that Ini and IA determines, for each player, a non-decreasing sequence of sets of preference restrictions and a non-increasing
of sets of likelihood orderings. As a consequence, the sequence C i (R n i ) of choice sets is non-increasing. Since the set of preference restrictions is finite, the algorithm converges after a finite number of rounds.
For both players i, let R ∞ i := ∞ n=1 R n i be the limiting set of preference restrictions produced by the algorithm defined by Ini and IA.
Proposition 2 Let G be a finite 2-player strategic game. Then, for both players i, a strategy s i survives iterated admissibility if and only if s i ∈ C i (R ∞ i ).
Proposition 2 echoes Brandenburger et al.'s (2008, Theorem 9 .1) epistemic characterization of iterated admissibility (see also the observation that Stahl, 1995, makes in his theorem), by pointing out that iterated admissibility corresponds to likelihood orderings where strategies eliminated in a later round are deemed infinitely more likely than strategies eliminated in an earlier round, and surviving strategies are deemed infinitely more likely than strategies eliminated in some round. Here we let these likelihood orderings interplay with sets of preference restrictions, thereby allowing comparison with the algorithm for proper rationalizability, presented next.
An algorithm for proper rationalizability
We finally consider proper rationalizability, a concept defined by Schuhmacher (1999) and characterized by Asheim (2001) . We refer to these references for details.
PR For every n ≥ 1, and both players i, let
From the properties of L r i (·) and R i (·), it follows that Ini and PR determines, for each player, a non-decreasing sequence of sets of preference restrictions and a non-increasing sequence of sets of likelihood orderings. Since the set of preference restrictions is finite, the algorithm converges after a finite number of rounds.
For both players i, let R ∞ i := ∞ n=1 R n i be the limiting set of preference restrictions produced by the algorithm defined by Ini and PR.
Proposition 3 Let G be a finite 2-player strategic game. Then, for both players i, a strategy s i is properly rationalizable if and only if
Proof. Perea (2008) .
Applying the algorithms
In this section we put the algorithms to work. In the first subsection we present three examples illustrating how the sequences of preference restrictions that the algorithms give rise to shed light on differences between iterated admissibility and proper rationalizability. In particular, in the first example, the set of strategies surviving iterated admissibility is a strict subset of the set of properly rationalizable strategies, while the sequences of preference restrictions for iterated admissibility and proper rationalizability coincide in the latter two examples.
In the second subsection we build on insights conveyed by the examples and provide through Proposition 4 a sufficient condition ensuring that any properly rationalizable strategy survives iterated admissibility. In particular, since proper equilibrium always exists and any strategy being used with positive probability in a proper equilibrium is properly rationalizable, we reach the following conclusion: If a game-for which iterated admissibility leads to a unique strategy for each playersatisfies the sufficient condition of Proposition 4, then the surviving strategies are the unique properly rationalizable strategies and the corresponding strategy profile is the unique proper equilibrium.
In the third subsection we consider a recent contribution on commitment bargaining (Ellingsen and Miettinen, 2008) and use the algorithm of Section 3.3 to show how proper rationalizability yields the outcomes they point to in their propositions, while other concepts do not.
Examples
We now illustrate our algorithms by means of three examples. Before doing so, we introduce the following piece of notation: For a given set R i of preference restrictions on S i , define the monotonic cover of R i by
Every set R n i of preference restrictions produced by each algorithm on the way to R ∞ i can clearly be written as the monotonic cover of some smaller set.
[ Figure 1 about here.]
In G 1 , illustrated in Figure 1 (and discussed by Asheim and Dufwenberg, 2003) , iterated admissibility works by eliminating D, R, and M , leading to (U, L), while the concept of proper rationalizability rules out just D. In the first round, the only restriction imposed by both iterated admissibility and proper rationalizability is that U is preferred to D and thus, (s 1 , A 1 ) is a preference restriction for 1 if and only if s 1 = D and A 1 U (which in the notation just introduced is written
In the algorithm of proper rationalizability, this means that the likelihood ordering over player 1's strategies must satisfy that U is infinitely more likely than D. Since this does not imply anything about the relative likelihood of M and D, which is what the preferences of player 2 depend on, no preference restriction is imposed on 2. Thus the algorithm converges after one round.
In contrast, since C 1 (mc{(D, {U })}) = {U, M }, a likelihood ordering assumes C 1 (mc{(D, {U })}) if each of U and M is infinitely more likely than D. This in turn means that L is preferred to R and U is preferred to M in the algorithm of preference restrictions that characterizes iterated admissibility (cf. Section 3.2), with ({U }, {M }, {D}) and ({L}, {R}) as the corresponding likelihood orderings. The likelihood ordering, ({L}, {R}), for player 2 entails that player 1 deems L infinitely more likely that R and therefore prefers D to M (and, of course, U to D since the former weakly dominates the latter). However, this means that the likelihood ordering, ({U }, {M }, {D}), for player 1 determined by the algorithm characterizing iterated admissibility does not respect the preferences of player 1 that the same algorithm give rise to.
[ Figure 2 about here.]
Compare G 1 to G 2 , which is the game illustrated in Figure 2 . In G 2 , the algorithms of iterated admissibility and proper rationalizability coincide in terms of the sets of preference restrictions. In the first round, the only restriction imposed by both iterated admissibility and proper rationalizability is that U is preferred to D;
i.e., R 1 1 = mc{(D, {U })}. Even though the set of likelihood orderings that assumes C 1 (mc{(D, {U })}) is a strict subset of the set of likelihood orderings that respects mc{(D, {U })} (since only the former requires that M must be deemed infinitely more likely than D), every member of each set deems U infinitely more likely than D. This is sufficient to conclude L is preferred to R and U is preferred to M in the algorithms of iterated admissibility and proper rationalizability.
A key observation for game G 2 is that U weakly dominates D, and that L weakly dominates R on both {U } (which is the strategy used to eliminate D in the first round of iterated admissibility) and {U, M } (which is the set of strategies for player 1 surviving the first round of iterated admissibility). The same kind of observation can be made for the centipede game, which we turn to next.
[ Figure 3 about here.]
In the four-legged centipede game illustrated in Figure 3 it is also the case that the algorithms of iterated admissibility and proper rationalizability coincide in terms of the sets of preference restrictions. In the first round, the only restriction imposed by both iterated admissibility and proper rationalizability is that fd is preferred to ff ; i.e., R 1 2 = mc{(ff , {fd })}. Even though the set of likelihood orderings that assumes C 2 (mc{(ff , {fd })}) is a strict subset of the set of likelihood orderings that respects mc{(ff , {fd })} (since only the former requires that d must be deemed infinitely more likely than ff ), every member of each set deems fd infinitely more likely than ff. This is sufficient to conclude FD is preferred to FF. Even though the set of likelihood orderings that assumes C 1 (mc{(FF , {FD})}) is a strict subset of the set of likelihood orderings that respects mc{(FF , {FD})} (since only the former requires that D must be deemed infinitely more likely than FF ), every member of each set deems FD infinitely more likely than FF. This is sufficient to conclude d is preferred to fd and D is preferred to FD.
Note that in the second round, FD weakly dominates FF on both {fd } (which is the strategy used to eliminate ff in the first round of iterated admissibility) and {d, fd } (which is the set of strategies for player 2 surviving the first round of iterated admissibility). Likewise, in the third round, d weakly dominates fd and ff on both {FD} (which is the strategy used to eliminate FF in the second round of iterated admissibility) and {D, FD} (which is the set of strategies for player 1 surviving the second round of iterated admissibility). Similar conclusions hold for any centipede game independent of size and illustrates how both iterated admissibility and proper rationalizability correspond to the procedure of backward induction in such games. 1
A sufficient condition
The following proposition presents a sufficient condition under which iterated admissibilty does not rule out properly rationalizable strategies.
Proposition 4 Consider a finite 2-player strategic game G where the procedure of iterated admissibility leads to the sequence S n 1 , S n 2 ∞ n=0 of surviving strategy sets. Suppose that there exists a sequence A n 1 , A n 2 ∞ n=0 of strategy sets satisfying, for both players i, A 0 i = S i and for each n ∈ N,
, then, for every s i ∈ S i \S n i , s i is weakly dominated by every a i ∈ A n i on either (A n−1 j and S n−1 j ) or S j ,
Then, for both players i, if s i is properly rationalizable, then
1 For finite perfect information games without relevant payoff ties, proper rationalizability leads to the unique profile of backward induction strategies (Schuhmacher, 1999; Asheim, 2001) , and iterated admissibility leads to the backward induction outcome (see Battigalli, 1997, pp. 52-53, for relevant references). While the algorithms of Sections 3.2 and 3.3 correspond to the backward induction procedure in the subclass of centipede games, this does not hold for the whole class of finite perfect information games without relevant payoff ties.
Both G 2 of Figure 2 and G 3 of Figure 3 can be used to illustrate Proposition 4. In G 2 , the procedure of iterated admissibility yields the following sequence of strategy sets: S 1 1 = S 2 1 = {U, M } and S n 1 = {U } for n ≥ 3, and S 1 2 = {L, R} and S n 2 = {L} for n ≥ 2. Choose A n 1 = {U } for n ≥ 1, and A 1 2 = {L, R} and A n 2 = {L} for n ≥ 2. It is straightforward to check that the conditions of Proposition 4 are satisfied; in particular, L weakly dominates R on both A 1 1 = {U } and S 1 1 = {U, M }, and U weakly dominates M on A 2 2 = S 2 2 = {L}, and weakly dominates D on S 2 . In G 3 , the procedure of iterated admissibility yields the following sequence of strategy sets: S 1 1 = {D, FD, FF }, S 2 1 = S 3 1 = {D, FD} and S n 1 = {D} for n ≥ 4, and S 1 2 = S 2 2 = {d, fd } and S n 1 = {d} for n ≥ 3. Choose A 1 1 = {D, FD, FF }, A 2 1 = A 3 1 = {FD} and A n 1 = {D} for n ≥ 4, and A 1 2 = A 2 2 = {fd } and A n 2 = {d} for n ≥ 3. Again, it is straightforward to check that the conditions of Proposition 4 are satisfied; in particular, FD weakly dominates FF on both A 1 2 = {fd } and S 1 2 = {d, fd }, d weakly dominates both fd and ff on both A 2 1 = {FD} and S 2 1 = {D, FD}, and D weakly dominates both FD and FF on A 3 2 = S 3 2 = {d}.
Commitment bargaining
The algorithms of Section 3 can be applied for the purpose of analyzing economically significant models, independently of whether the sufficient condition of Proposition 4 is satisfied. In particular, they can be used for comparing iterated admissibility to properly rationalizability strategies in specific strategic situations. In this subsection we consider a model of bilateral commitment bargaining due to Ellingsen and Miettinen (2008, Section I). Ellingsen and Miettinen (2008) reexamine the problem of observable commitments in bargaining, first studied by Schelling (1956) and later formalized by Craw- Crawford's (1982) analysis by considering variants of iterated admissibility and refinements of Nash equilibrium.
ford (1982). Ellingsen and Miettinen (2008) extends
Here we show how some of the outcomes that Ellingsen and Miettinen (2008) suggest, in particular through their Lemma 2 and Proposition 2, can be obtained by using proper rationalizability instead of iterated admissibility. There is actually a mistake in their Lemma 2, but we will come back to this later.
In order to turn their strategic situation where two players bargain over real numbered fractions of a surplus of size 1 into a finite one-stage game with simultaneous moves, we introduce a smallest money unit g. We measure all variables in terms of numbers of the smallest money unit, and assume that k units of the smallest money unit equals the total surplus (i.e., k · g = 1). Hence, players 1 and 2 bargain over a surplus of size k.
Each player i chooses, simultaneously with the other, either to commit to some demand s i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k} or to wait and remain uncommitted. Let w denote the waiting strategy. Hence the strategy set of each player i is S i = {0, 1, . . . , k} ∪ {w}.
If both players choose w, then each player i receives β i > 1, where β 1 + β 2 = k.
In the case with certain commitments and no commitment costs (Ellingsen and Miettinen, 2008 , Section I) the payoffs are as follows: If only one player i makes a commitment s i , then i receives s i and the other player receives k −s i . If both players make commitments, then each player i receives x i (s i , s j ) ∈ {s i , s i + 1, . . . , k − s j },
The payoff function u i (s i , s j ) of each player i can be summarized as follows: Ellingsen and Miettinen (2008) show through the proof of their Lemma 2 that, for each player i, iterated admissibility leads to the elimination of 0, 1, . . . , β i in the first round, and β i + 1, β i + 2, . . . , k − 1 in the second round, leaving k and w as the surviving strategies. Actually, with only k and w as the surviving strategies, w is eliminated in the third round, since choosing k yields player i a payoff of 0 if the opponent also chooses k and k if the opponent chooses w, while choosing w yields player i a payoff of 0 if the opponent chooses k and β i (< k) if the opponent also chooses w. Hence, the correct statement of Ellingsen and Miettinen's (2008) Lemma 2 is that only k is iteratively weakly undominated. Ellingsen and Miettinen (2008) use Lemma 2 in their subsequent Proposition 2 to focus on Nash equilibria involving only the strategies k and w (including asymmetric equilibria where one commits to the entire surplus and the other waits), as opposed to the plethora of unrefined Nash equilibria that this game gives rise to (cf. Crawford, 1982) . Their Proposition 2 states that only the two asymmetric equilibria along with the symmetric equilibrium where both claim the entire surplus are consistent with two rounds of elimination of weakly dominated strategies. This statement is correct, but it begs the question: why stop with two rounds of weak elimination?
As the following proposition shows, proper rationalizability provides a reason for considering only the strategies k and w.
Proposition 5 Consider the finite version of Ellingsen and Miettinen's (2008, Sec- tion I) bilateral commitment bargaining game with zero commitment cost. The properly rationalizable strategies for each player is to commit to the whole surplus, i.e., to choose the strategy k, or to wait, i.e., to choose the strategy w.
The proof of Proposition 5 consists of two parts. The one part uses the algorithm of Section 3.3 to show that no strategy but k and w can be properly rationalizable.
Since w weakly dominates 0, 1, . . . , β j for player j, respect of j's preferences forces player i to deem w infinitely more likely than each of 0, 1, . . . , β j . This in turn implies that k weakly dominates β i + 1, β i + 2, . . . , k − 1 for player i. Hence, only k and w can be best responses when players are cautious.
The other part uses the result of Asheim (2001, Proposition 2) -that any strategy being used with positive probability in a proper equilibrium is properly rationalizable -to show that k and w are properly rationalizable. In particular, the asymmetric equilibria where one player commits to the entire surplus and the other waits are proper. In addition, there is a proper equilibrium where both players choose k with probability 1. 2 In any proper equilibrium, at most one player attains positive payoff and no strategy but k and w is assigned positive probability. Thus, the concept of proper equilibrium focuses precisely on the equilibria highlighted in Ellingsen and Miettinen's (2008) Ellingsen and Miettinen (2008, Section II) also consider a variant of Crawford's (1982) bilateral commitment bargaining game where commitments are uncertain. In their Proposition 4 they show that only k survives iterated admissibility if commitments are uncertain. Actually, the iterations involve one round of weak elimination, followed by two rounds of strict elimination. Hence, only k survives the DekelFudenberg procedure, and it follows from the algorithms of Sections 3.1 and 3.3 that only k is properly rationalizable (and thus, (k, k) is the only proper equilibrium). In their Propositions 1 and 3 they consider costly commitments. In this case, it can be shown that every strategy surviving iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies is properly rationalizable. Hence in all variants considered by Ellingsen and Miettinen (2008) , proper rationalizability and proper equilibrium yield the outcomes they point to in their propositions, while other concepts do not.
Concluding remarks
In our opinion, proper rationalizability is an attractive concept which is based on appealing epistemic conditions. However, up to now, its applicability has been hampered by the lack of an algorithm leading directly to the properly rationalizable strategies. With Perea's (2008) algorithm, this roadblock has been removed.
In this paper we have compared proper rationalizability to the Dekel-Fudenberg procedure and iterated admissibility by presenting comparable algorithms for the two latter concepts. Through a bilateral commitment bargaining game due to Crawford (1982) and Ellingsen and Miettinen (2008) we have illustrated the usefulness of proper rationalizability in economic applications.
A Proofs
In order to prove Proposition 1, we need the following lemma.
If. Suppose there does not exist µ i ∈ ∆(D i ) such that µ i strictly dominates
Proof of Proposition 1.
The Dekel-Fudenberg procedure is given by the following sequence of strategy subsets:
(ii) For each player i, let S 1 i = {s i ∈ S i | s i not weakly dominated on S j }.
(iii) For every n ≥ 2, and each player i, let
We show, by induction on n, that C i (R n i ) = S n i for each player i and all n. Part (i). For n = 0, we have that
for each player i.
Part (ii).
For n = 1, we have that
Therefore,
Part (iii). Now, let n ≥ 2, and assume that for each player i,
by our induction assumption. But then,
Consider the strategies s i where for every
By Lemma 1, we know that these are exactly the strategies s i that are strictly dominated by some µ i ∈ ∆(A i ) on S n−1 j . Hence, we may conclude that
Hence,
which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2.
Iterated admissibility is given by the following sequence of strategy subsets:
(ii) For every n ≥ 1, and each player i, let
Part (ii).
Let n ≥ 1, and assume that, for each player i, C i (R k i ) = S k i for all k < n. We show that, for each player i, C i (R n i ) = S n i . Fix a player i. By definition, we have that
By the induction assumption, we know that C j (R k j ) = S k j for all k < n, and hence
) , it follows that R n i contains exactly those preference restrictions (s i , A i ) such that s i is weakly dominated by some µ i ∈ ∆(A i ) on some S k j with k < n. Hence,
Proof of Proposition 4.
n=1 be the sequence of preference restrictions according to the algorithm of proper rationalizability (cf. Section 3.3).
It is sufficient to show, under the assumptions of the proposition, that for both player i and each n, it holds that, for every s i ∈ S i \S n i , (s i , {a i }) ∈ R n i for every a i ∈ A n i . In this case, namely, every properly rationalizable strategy must be in ∞ n=1 S n i . We show by induction that the statement above is true.
Part (i).
For n = 0, we have that S 0 i = S i , so that there is no s i ∈ S i \S n i and the statement is trivially true.
Part (ii).
Let n ≥ 1, and assume that, for each player i and each m ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}, it holds that, for every s i ∈ S i \S m i , (s i , {a i }) ∈ R m i for every a i ∈ A m i . Fix a player i. We first make the observation that, for each m ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1},
This is true by the full support assumption if S m j = S j (and thus A m j = S j ). Assume now that S m j = S j . If L j respects R m j , then for every s j ∈ S j \S m j , a j i s j for every a j ∈ A m j , and the observation follows also in this case.
If S n i = S i , then the statement is trivially true also for n.
. By a premise of the proposition, for every s i ∈ S i \S n i , s i is weakly dominated by every a i ∈ A n i on either (A n −1 j and S n −1 j ) or S j . If s i is weakly dominated by a i on A n −1 j and S n −1 j , then s i is weakly dominated by a i on each strategy set D j satisfying A
. If s i is weakly dominated by a i on S j , then by the
Hence, since the sequence of sets of preference restrictions is non-decreasing, for every s i ∈ S i \S n i , (s i , {a i }) ∈ R n i for every a i ∈ A n i .
Proof of Proposition 5. The proof is divided into two parts. In part (i) we
show that the strategies in S i \ ({k} ∪ {w}) are not properly rationalizable. In part
(ii) we show that k and w are properly rationalizable.
n=1 be the sequence of preference restrictions for the finite version of Ellingsen and Miettinen's (2008, Section I) bilateral commitment bargaining game with zero commitment cost, according to the algorithm of proper rationalizability (cf. Section 3.3). In order to show that the strategies in S i \ ({k} ∪ {w}) = {0, 1, . . . , k − 1} are not properly rationalizable, it is sufficient to show that for each player i, it holds that (a) for every s i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , β i }, (s i , {w}) ∈ R 1 i , and (b) for every s i ∈ {β i +1, β i +2, . . . , k−1}, (s i , {k}) ∈ R 2 i , keeping in mind that the sequence of sets of preference restrictions is non-decreasing.
Result (a) follows from the fact that, for each player i and for every s i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , β i }, w weakly dominates s i on S j . Hence, for each player i and for every
follows from the fact that, for each player i and for every s i ∈ {β i +1, β i +2, . . . , k −1}, k weakly dominates s i on each strategy set D j satisfying {w} ⊆ D j ⊆ {β j + 1, β j + 2, . . . , k} ∪ {w}.
Hence, for each player i and for every s i ∈ {β i + 1, β i + 2, . . . , k − 1}, (s i , {k}) ∈
We establish that k and w are properly rationalizable in the finite version of Ellingsen and Miettinen's (2008, Section I) bilateral commitment bargaining game with zero commitment cost, by showing that both k and w can be used with positive probability in a proper equilibrium; thus, they are properly rationalizable (Asheim, 2001 , Proposition 2). To prove this claim, consider the likelihood orderings L 1 = {{k}, {k − 1}, . . . , {β 1 + 1}, {w}, {β 1 }, {β 1 − 1}, . . . , {1}, {0}} and L 2 = {{w}, {1}, {2}, . . . , {β 2 − 1}, {k}, {k − 1}, . . . , {β 2 + 1}, {β 2 }}. Since each element in either of these partitions contains only one strategy, they determine a pair of LPSs. It is straightforward to check that this pair of LPSs is a proper equilibrium, according to Blume et al.'s (1991b, Proposition 5 ) characterization, where player 1 chooses k with probability 1 and player 2 chooses w with probability 1.
Claim Consider the finite version of Ellingsen and Miettinen's (2008, Section I) bilateral commitment bargaining game with zero commitment cost.
(i) There exists a proper equilibrium where both players assign probability 1 to k.
(ii) For both players i and any strategy ∈ {β i + 1, β i + 2, . . . , k − 1}, there exists a perfect equilibrium where player i assigns positive probability to both w and and player j assigns probability 1 to k.
Proof. Part (i). Consider the LPSs
where for both players i and each ∈ {1, . . . , k + 1}, the support of λ i is included in {w, k + 1 − } for ∈ {1, . . . , β i + 1}, {w, 1} for = β i + 2, {w, k + 2 − } for ∈ {β i + 3, . . . , k}, and {w, 0} for = k + 1. Let, for each ∈ {1, . . . , k + 1}, λ i be determined by u j (w,
The LPSs λ 1 and λ 2 determine the following likelihood orderings:
L 2 = {{k}, {w, k − 1}, {k − 2}, . . . , {β 1 + 1}, {β 1 }, {1}, {β 1 − 1}, . . . , {2}, {0}} .
It can be checked that L 1 respects the set of preference restrictions that u 1 and λ 2 give rise to, and that L 2 respects the set of preference restrictions that u 2 and λ 1 give rise to. It follows from Blume et al.'s (1991b, Proposition 5) characterization that (λ 1 1 , λ 1 2 ) is a proper equilibrium. Note that, for both players i, λ 1 i (k) = 1. Part (ii). Let (λ 1 1 , λ 1 2 ) satisfy that (1) λ 1 1 (k) = 1, and (2) λ 1 2 (w) = β 1 /k and λ 1 2 ( ) = 1 − β 1 /k for some ∈ {β 2 + 1, β 2 + 2, . . . , k − 1} (so that λ 1 2 (s 2 ) = 0 otherwise). Then λ 1 1 is not weakly dominated and the unique best response for 1 to λ 1 2 , and λ 1 2 is not weakly dominated 4 and a best response for 2 to λ 1 1 . The 4 Suppose that there exists λ 2 such that λ 2 weakly dominates λ 1 2 . Since w weakly dominates all other strategies on {β1, β1 + 1, . . . , k − 1}, λ 2 (w) ≥ λ 1 2 (w). Since u2(w, k − ) = u2( , k − ) = > u2(s2, k − ) for s2 = w, , it follows that 1 ≥ λ 2 (w) + λ 2 ( ) ≥ λ result that (λ 1 1 , λ 1 2 ) is perfect follows from the fact that, in two player games, any Nash-equilibrium in strategies that are not weakly dominated is perfect.
Likewise for (λ 1 1 , λ 1 2 ) with (1) λ 1 1 (w) = β 2 /k and λ 1 1 ( ) = 1 − β 2 /k for some ∈ {β 1 + 1, β 1 + 2, . . . , k − 1} (so that λ 1 1 (s 1 ) = 0 otherwise), and (2) λ 1 2 (k) = 1. 
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